Five Principles for Surviving Our Predictably Uncertain Future

How can Canada (or anyone else) survive in a world without trust?

Alexander Wendt once famously argued (well, famously to international relations scholars) that “anarchy is what states make of it.” His point essentially was that, while it is true that international politics exists without a central authority to enforce rules, there are very different ways states can interact with one another in such a system. Relationships may be threatening or not, predictable or not, mutually beneficial or not.

In a later book, he suggests there are recurring patterns of interaction that one can identify: Kantian, Lockean, and Hobbesian (or, if you like, friends, frenemies, and enemies). For instance, relations between longstanding allies may be predictably warm and supportive. We have seen such interactions repeatedly among democracies and even some non-democracies over the last century as they have banded together in the face of many forms of adversity. States may at other times treat one another as rivals—willing to work with one another on a transactional, competitive basis, but without an enduring sense of trust. Then again, states may also view one another as enemies, to be opposed and thwarted at every turn.

In 2025, the statement is newly relevant for two reasons. First, it’s now abundantly clear that with Donald Trump as President, the United States is a country without friends, or more specifically a country that treats longstanding friends no better than rivals, and quite often worse. Every relationship is transactional, and every interaction is pursued for relative advantage—even if “winning” the deal comes at a considerable cost to both parties. A trade war between any two countries will cause both to suffer both in absolute terms, as well as in comparison to the 190-odd countries not involved in the fight.

Second, the international system is about to get more anarchical in a different sense—namely, uncertain. The current American president appears to put precious little stock in being seen as true to his word. This, again, is going to be costly to the US over time, as a state that cannot be trusted will not be. Ironically, even the failure to follow through on threats can further erode credibility. To that end, the fact that the US may though also may not be once again delaying the promised 25% tariff against Canada and Mexico is relevant. It could be on 1 Feb, or 1 March, or maybe 18 February. It might include oil and copper, but then again perhaps not right away. It might have an exemption application process, or not, and might actually be 10%, rather than 25% on some goods. Some of this will be clarified tomorrow, but much will remain murky. It all may come to pass, but then again, it may not. In short, America under President Trump seems as uncertain in its commitment to its threats as its promises.

This helps clarify the situation for any state with a significant relationship with the US. Accordingly, I’ve compiled a list of principles to guide decision-making in the world post-January 20th, 2025:

1. Until proven otherwise, the US President appears unconcerned with the credibility of either his threats or his promises. Just because a tariff is threatened does not mean it will be implemented. At the same time, just because it’s rescinded doesn’t mean it won’t return. Even stranger, a threat may be enacted no matter what the target state does—effectively undermining the purpose of the threat.

   Effectively, everything is subject to negotiation to the last minute and beyond, unless it isn’t. The recent quickly rescinded tariff threat against Colombia last week also suggests that, as during the first Trump administration, it may be possible to conclude new agreements based on limited concessions that hand the US president the appearance of a “win”. The catch is that those new deals may be no more reliable than the threats that preceded them, however. Simply put, until further notice US partners must assume America no longer cares about its credibility with either allies or rivals—a fundamental break with past priorities.

2. The US President does not distinguish between American friend and rival, ally and enemy. The metric that matters is *perceived* strength and weakness. In a world without friends, there are only predators and prey. Moreover, by the reckoning of the perceiver-in-chief, America’s democratic allies tend to look weak given their governments’ need to compromise, work with domestic opposition, and generally listen to voters. In contrast, authoritarian leaders exude the kind of strength that the US President openly admires. Thus tariffs threatened against democracies exceed those against autocracies.

   As a consequence of this, allies will remain preferred targets so long as they appear relatively weak and ripe for bullying. States and leaders that appear strong—united, able to return jibe for jibe, and deal damage in return for damage—will be less likely to be picked on in the first place, and better positioned to negotiate some deal along the above lines if they are.

3. Questions of the credibility of any particular threat or promise aside, uncertainty has become the most predictable element of relations with the US. Tomorrow is promised to no one. Thus, any state dependent on America, whether for military support, capital, markets, development assistance, or anything else must start making alternative plans, taking seriously that the world is moving in a more self-reliant direction.

   This takes many forms. In Canada’s case, it means searching for ways to diversify economic activities away from the US through trade with other allies and reduction of internal trade barriers. It also means enhancing our own ability to secure our borders (ironically not to fulfill the US’s demand that we do so, but because of the way in which the US has made the demand). It means enhancing our ability to defend our own sovereignty, including in areas of current limited Canadian capacity, as in the Arctic where we might have been previously inclined to rely on American help.

4. Those under pressure will be stronger sticking together. If America truly no longer recognizes friend from foe, any efforts by Canadian premiers, whether progressive or conservative, to win carveouts for particular industries will be unstable even if successful, subject to continual uncertainty. Working together creatively against tariffs will make all better off.

   Moreover, such creative solutions are all around us. I heard one such idea just this week on a panel from Prof. Ilan Vertinsky of UBC. He pointed out that there is no reason why Canada could not employ voluntary quotas on US-bound exports to address the President’s fixation with trade imbalances. If the exports are in high demand—and if the demand is “inelastic,” meaning there are few ready alternatives—Canada can sell less for more, driving the price up even as the overall quantity of trade declines. Simply throttle back on things like US-bound oil and critical minerals while aggressively searching for ways to divert the remainder to other markets. It’s a win all around north of the border, as Canada’s extractive sectors maintain revenues even as it diversifies markets. The country likewise turns a profit off meeting a Trumpian demand while making such demands less effective in future.

5. Countries are not alone in any of this. Canada and Mexico, for instance, are subject to the same tariff threat. If the time comes when it is imposed, a coordinated response by the two countries will be far more likely to bite, getting the attention of American voters, and by extension, American decision-makers. A tariff will be costly for Americans, driving up prices, and a well-constructed and coordinated response will magnify that effect. More generally, the benefits of trade for economic progress still remain, as do the benefits of collective security among allies—among friends. States continue to have an enduring interested in cooperation. Keeping that light burning will help states weather the storms to come, and make it that much easier to rebuild wider cooperatively structures if and when the current populist moment passes.

That leads to a final point: while foreign policy looms large, states cannot forget about how we got here. The urgent cannot blind us to the important. While the causes of declining trust are multiple, some of it really does come back to economics. Globalization has enabled states to produce much more wealth, but this populist wave will not fully recede as long as those economic processes leave significant parts of the world’s population feeling poorer and politically powerless. As long as economies create exaggerated winners and losers, with a significant portion of the population—particularly young people—feeling left behind, economic frustration and anxiety will drive their political decision-making. So long as it seems like ambition and prosperity are the preserve of others, voters will continue to listen to the most radical voices among us.

Cover image: By Keepscases - Own workVectorized from http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=8015756